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Abstract  - Financial engineering often involves redefining existing financial assets to create new 
financial products. This paper investigates whether financial engineering can alter the environment so 
that irrational agents can quickly learn to be rational. The specific environment we investigate is based 
on the Monty Hall problem, a well-studied choice anomaly. Our results show that, by the end of the 
experiment, the majority of subjects understand the Monty Hall anomaly. Average valuation of the 
experimental asset is very close to the expected value based on the true probabilities. 
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Psychologists and experimental economists have collected convincing evidence 
that many agents regularly violate the rationality assumptions usually made by financial 
economists.  Most recent research in behavioral finance investigates the theoretical and 
empirical consequences.  The present paper, however, explores a rather different 
behavioral question: can financial engineering ever reduce or eliminate irrationality? 
Financial engineering can be defined as “combining or carving up existing 
financial assets to create new financial products” (Harvey, 2005). Such products allow 
agents to trade positions that are otherwise more costly or even unavailable.  But perhaps 
financial engineering has additional impact, altering the environment so that agents can 
learn to behave more or perhaps less rationally.  For instance, some investigators believe 
that “portfolio insurance,” engineered in the mid 1980s, encouraged irrationality 
associated with the 1987 stock market crash.
1   
To investigate such questions, we conduct a controlled laboratory experiment 
based on the Monty Hall problem, one of the most persistent and best documented 
examples of irrational behavior.  Using methods adapted from earlier studies, we first 
verify the presence of erroneous beliefs and choices.  Next we engineer a specific 
financial asset that embeds the Monty Hall problem, and require individual subjects to 
value this asset.  Finally, we repeat the initial test for the existence of the Monty Hall 
                                                 
1 After the 1987 stock market crash, the government commissioned a presidential task force (the Brady 
Commission) to investigate causes of the crash, and to recommend measures to reduce the likelihood of 
future crashes.  Although portfolio insurance was not the only cause of the crash, it was identified as a 
contributing factor (Fabozzi and Modigliani (2003), p. 269-270). 
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error.  We do not conduct an actual market, so subjects can’t learn from competitive 
prices or from observation of others’ trading behavior.  Nevertheless, by the end of the 
experiment, most subjects have learned to avoid the error.  Indeed, to our knowledge, our 
final Monty Hall error rate is lower than in any other previous individual learning 
environment.  We conclude that the mere act of valuing an appropriately engineered asset 
can be a powerful learning experience. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses relevant 
previous research, and Section 3 presents the experimental design.  The experimental 
results are reported in Section 4.  Section 5 summarizes.  Appendix A includes the 
instructions to subjects.   
 
2. Background 
  Financial engineering and behavioral finance are two of the most currently 
popular topics in Finance, but there is not much prior research linking the two.  The most 
relevant previous studies are concerned separately with framing effects in market 
experiments, and with the Monty Hall problem.  We begin with the former topic. 
2.1 Framing in markets 
Framing effects refer to the possibility that alternative ways of posing an identical 
problem may affect agents’ choices.  Several sorts of framing effects are well-
documented in individual choice experiments (See Camerer (1995) for a review). 
Financial engineering involves the creation of new financial assets from existing assets.  
As such, it can present investors with a re-framed version of the underlying decision 
problem, and may lead to different valuations.  
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Two prior studies examine framing in experimental asset markets.  Kirchler, 
Maciejovsky and Weber (2004) study an asset market where the end of period payoff on 
the traded asset has a normal distribution with announced mean and variance.  Positively 
framed subjects are also given the redundant information that there is a five percent 
chance that the next payoff will be higher than the corresponding .95 value, while 
negatively framed subjects are told that there is a five percent chance the next payoff will 
be lower than the corresponding .05 value. The authors report that positively framed 
subjects are more likely to be buyers and negatively framed subjects are more often 
sellers.  Prices, however, are unaffected. 
  Weber, Keppe and Meyer-Delius (2000) study framing in an experimental asset 
market with a risky asset whose payoff depends on a drawing from an urn containing 
yellow and white balls.  In positive frame treatments, some subjects are endowed with 
cash and shares of a white asset (W), which pays 100 if a white ball is drawn from the urn 
at the end of the period (and zero otherwise).  In negative frame treatments, these subjects 
begin with a short position in yellow assets (Y), which pay 100 only if a yellow ball is 
drawn.  Since a portfolio of one white share and one yellow share pays 100 for sure (W + 
Y = 100), a share of one asset is equivalent to cash and a short position in the other asset 
(W = 100 – Y).  Negatively framed endowments substitute 100 - Y for each white share 
in the corresponding positively framed endowment. Although Weber, Keppe and Meyer-
Delius use the term “endowment frame,” they are clearly practicing financial engineering 
when changing from the positive frame (endowments with only long positions) to the 
negative frame (endowment containing a short position).  The authors report higher asset 
prices in the negative endowment frame; subjects with short positions were willing to pay 
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a higher price to buy assets to cover their short positions.  Evidently subjects are not 
always maximizing expected utility, but the design can not tell us whether the divergence 
from rationality is occurring in the positive frame, the negative frame, or both. 
2.2. The Monty Hall problem 
The Monty Hall problem is a stylized version of a game from the classic TV show 
“Let’s Make A Deal.”  Game show host Monty Hall asks a contestant to choose one of 
three doors.  One of these doors conceals a valuable prize such as a new car while the 
other two doors conceal worthless prizes.  After the contestant picks a door, Monty 
always opens one of the remaining doors and reveals one of the worthless prizes.  Then 
Monty gives the contestant a chance to switch doors, that is, to choose the remaining 
door.  The probability that the valuable prize is behind the original door is one-third, so 
switching to the remaining door has a two-thirds probability of winning.  Thus the 
rational strategy is to switch. The contestant, however, refuses to switch in the belief that 
his strategy will win with probability (at least) one-half.
 2  
The Monty Hall problem has been extensively studied in the laboratory, and the 
error is very common and very persistent.  Indeed, even after having the error explained, 
many people cling to the belief that winning is equally likely whether or not the 
contestant switches.  Such people include several professors, including a mathematician 
(e.g., Haddon, 2003, p. 61-65).  Friedman (1998) finds an initial error rate of almost 90%, 
and even in his most intense learning environments the error rate seldom drops much 
below 50%; the overall error rate was about 70%.  Page (1998) finds that even subjects 
trained in a rather transparent version (with hundred doors) typically revert to the error in 
the standard three door version.  Slembeck and Tyran (2002) and Palacios-Huerta (2003) 
                                                 
2 Friedman (1998) notes some gaps between this stylized version and the actual game show.  
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show that social learning (e.g., with group decisions) can be effective in overcoming the 
error, but confirm that the error persists in individual learning environments. 
Kluger and Wyatt (2004) embed the Monty Hall problem into a financial asset in 
order to study whether the Monty Hall error aggregates into market prices.  The asset 
features a conversion option that corresponds to switching doors.  They find that asset 
prices do not reflect the Monty Hall error in sessions where two or more subjects are 
identified as understanding the problem based on their performance in the individual 
experiments.  
Two results from these studies are especially pertinent to our experiment.  First, 
Friedman’s (1998) experiments demonstrate that repetition alone does not quickly 
eliminate the error.  Friedman’s control group repeated the Monty Hall exercise 25 times.  
Their switch rate over the first three repetitions was only 17%.  Their final switch rate, 
based on the last three repetitions was only 37%.  A one-tailed paired t-test rejects the 
null hypothesis that the final and initial switch rates are equal only at the 10% level.  The 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test also rejects this null hypothesis at the 10% significance level.  
Subjects learn to avoid the error very slowly, if at all. 
Second, the Kluger and Wyatt (2004) experiments demonstrate that simply 
translating the decision into the context of a financial asset does not automatically reduce 
the incidence of the Monty Hall error.  In cases where there aren’t two subjects who 
understand the Monty Hall problem, prices reflected the probability judgment error.  The 






3. Experimental design 
 
  We conducted an individual choice experiment with 40 subjects recruited from 
the undergraduate population at the University of California at Santa Cruz.  Each of the 
five sessions lasted approximately ninety minutes, including instructions, with average 
payouts of about twenty dollars per subject, paid in cash at the end of the session. 
**Table 1** 
Table 1 presents the experimental design.  Each session consists of five separate 
blocks, with each block containing one to sixteen periods of a given task.  There are two 
types of tasks, choice tasks and valuation tasks, which we now describe.  
3.1 Choice task 
  Our choice task is a modified version of the Monty Hall problem.  As in Friedman 
(1998) and subsequent laboratory studies, each period the subjects see three ordinary 
playing cards, placed face-down on a mat.  They are informed that two of the cards are 
red (hearts or diamonds), and one is black (clubs or spades).  One of the subjects 
(selected on a rotating basis) chooses one of three face-down cards to be the set-aside 
card, and the card is moved to the marked position on the mat.  Then, the person 
conducting the experiment looks privately at the two remaining cards, and always reveals 
one of them to be a red card.  Finally, subjects are asked to choose either the set-aside 
card, or the remaining card.  All subjects privately mark their choice on a form. After 
collecting the form, the conductor turns over both of the face-down cards.  If a subject 
correctly chose the black card, he or she earns sixty cents.  If incorrect, the subject earns 
nothing.  The sequence of events for a choice task period is presented in Figure 1. 
**Figure 1** 
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  Choosing the remaining card in this choice task corresponds to switching doors in 
the Monty Hall problem.  The remaining card has a two-thirds probability of winning, 
while the set-aside card has only a one-third chance of winning.  Therefore, a subject who 
correctly assesses the probabilities should always choose the remaining card. The 
common judgment error is to believe that each card is equally likely to win.   Subjects 
with this erroneous belief would regard all choices as having the same expected payoff, 
and so might indulge in any choice pattern.  
3.2 Valuation task 
  The choice task requires subjects to decide whether or not to switch cards.  The 
valuation task alters the Monty Hall problem, no longer requiring subjects to choose 
between the set-aside and the remaining card, but instead requiring subjects to determine 
a price at which they will sell a claim that pays cash if one of the unpicked cards is black.  
We use a choice menu procedure that can be regarded as a simplified version of the 
Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (1964) procedure for eliciting subjects’ valuations. The task 
has three variants, which we call R (revealed), U (unrevealed) and U+R (both). 
At the start of each R period, each subject is given one share of an asset that pays 
the bearer sixty cents if the remaining card that period is black and pays nothing 
otherwise.  As in the choice task just described, three cards are placed face-down on the 
mat, one of the subjects chooses the set-aside card, and the conductor reveals a red 
remaining card.  Each subject is then given the chance to sell his or her share.  The set of 
possible prices is 27, 29, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39, 41 or 43 cents, with the actual price 
determined by a random drawing from a bingo cage.  Subjects fill out a form asking them 
to choose whether or not to sell their share at each of the possible prices.  The random 
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drawing then determines the share price for the period. Finally, as before, the face-down 
cards are turned over.  Subjects who chose to sell at the price drawn receive that amount.  
Subjects who decided to keep the share will receive sixty cents only if the remaining card 
is black. 
  If a subject correctly assesses the probabilities, then the expected value of the 
share is forty cents; it is the sixty cent payoff if the remaining card is black times the two-
thirds probability of that event. An incorrect belief that the black card is equally likely to 
be either the set-aside card or the remaining card leads to the incorrect expected value of 
thirty cents. 
The U (unrevealed) periods are identical to the R periods, except that both 
remaining cards stay face-down until the last step; U periods skip the step where the 
conductor reveals a red set aside card. Therefore both remaining cards are face down 
when the subject is asked to value the asset, which will in effect pay sixty cents if either 
of the two remaining face-down cards is black.  Of course, determining value while both 
remaining cards are face-down does not affect the true valuation of the share, because 
revealing a red card is always feasible whether or not one of the remaining cards is black. 
  The U+R (both) periods require the subjects to value the shares twice.  Exactly as 
in the other periods, one of the subjects chooses the set-aside card.  Subjects then value 
their shares by circling either “keep” or “sell” at each of the possible prices.  Next, one of 
the remaining cards is turned over, always revealing a red card.  Subjects again value 
their shares by circling “keep” or “sell”, but on a second form.  However, only one of the 
forms will count.  A subject spins a six-sided die to determine whether the earlier form (a 
roll of 1, 2 or 3) or the later form (4, 5, or 6) will be active.  Finally the price is 
8 
determined according to a bingo drawing.  Subjects who circled sell at that price on the 
active form will then sell their share. 





  The results for each block of the experiment are presented in sequence.  We will 
see that the Monty Hall error is prevalent in the beginning, but declines considerably by 
the end of the session.  We focus on when in the intermediate blocks most of the subjects 
learn to behave optimally. 
4.1 Initial choice task 
  In Block A, subjects chose either the set-aside card, or the remaining card.  The 
remaining card is the optimal choice, giving the subject twice the chance of picking the 
black card and earning the sixty cent payoff.  The results are presented in Table 2. 
**Table 2** 
R% represents the percentage of the time (out of eight periods) that a subject 
chose the remaining card, the optimal choice.  Across all subjects, the average R% was 
58%, significantly higher than in some previous studies. (Possible reasons are discussed 
in section 4.4 below).  There are no obvious time trends within Block A; by period the 
average R% were 67.5%, 52.5%, 37.5%, 53.5%, 52.5%, 80%, 60%, and 65%.  Seven of 
the forty subjects picked the remaining card every time (R% = 100%).
3  Three subjects 
                                                 
3 We cannot safely assume that all of these subjects understand the correct probabilities.  If a subject 
believes that the remaining and the set-aside card are equally likely, then the expected payoff is the same 
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had an R% of zero.  The remaining thirty subjects sometimes chose the set-aside card, 
and other times chose the remaining card.   
Table 2 includes a chi-square goodness-of-fit test of the null hypothesis that R% 
follows a binomial distribution (with p = 50%); i.e., that subjects are equally likely to 
make either choice each period.  The test rejects the null hypothesis at a significance level 
of .001.  The reason is that both tails, R% = 100% and R% =0, occur far too often in the 
sample.  However, if the tails are dropped, i.e., we exclude the subjects who always 
choose remaining and who always choose set-aside, then the p-value becomes .14, and 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis. That is, many of the subjects appear to choose 
randomly in the first block. 
4.2 Valuation tasks 
  Block B consists of sixteen periods of the valuation task, alternating between R 
periods (where one of the remaining cards is revealed before eliciting values) and U 
periods (where both remaining cards are left face-down).  Of course, each subject’s 
response on the menu determines a range of values, not an exact value.  For our analysis, 
we assigned the midpoint of the range for intermediate choices. For example, if a subject 
kept the share at 33 cents but sold at 35 cents and above, then the assigned value is 34 
cents. For extreme choices the value is conservatively assigned to be a penny past the 
endpoint. Thus if the subject sold at every price, his or her value is between zero and 27 
cents, and we assigned the value of 26 cents. Likewise, a subject who kept at every price 
is assigned the value of 44 cents. 
*Table 3** 
                                                                                                                                                 
for any R%.  In fact, three of these seven subjects did not choose the remaining card every time in the 
subsequent choice-task periods at the end of the session. 
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Recall that the rational expected value is 40 cents and that the Monty Hall error 
implies an expected value of 30 cents. In U periods, the error should not arise because 
both of the remaining cards are face-down. Table 3 shows that indeed the average 
valuation for the U periods in Block B is 39.50 cents, very close to the expected value of 
forty cents.  The table also reports the results of two Wilcoxon signed-rank tests.  The 
“L40” tests the null hypothesis that the subject’s valuation is forty against the one-sided 
alternative hypothesis that the subject’s valuation is less than forty. The null hypothesis is 
rejected at a p-value of .05 in U periods for only ten of the forty subjects.  The “G30” 
tests the null that the subject’s valuation is thirty against the one-sided alternative 
hypothesis that the subject’s valuation is greater than thirty.  For the U periods, the null is 
rejected for 39 of 40 subjects at a p-value of .05.  Thus all evidence indicates that subjects 
value shares correctly in U periods of Block B.  
In the R periods, some subjects are making the Monty Hall error, but others are 
not.  The average valuation is 37.68 cents.  The rational null hypothesis in the “L40” test 
is rejected for one-half of the subjects in the direction of the Monty Hall error. However, 
the irrational null hypothesis in the “G30” test is rejected for 35 of 40 subjects in the 
rational direction. Apparently the error is present in Block B but in diluted form.   
**Table 4**   
  The experimental design permits another diagnostic test in Block B, comparing 
each subject’s valuations in the R periods to his or her valuation in the U periods.  The 
null hypothesis, that the values are the same, corresponds to rational beliefs.  Table 4 
shows that the null hypothesis is rejected using either the paired t-test, or the Wilcoxon 
11 
signed-rank test.  Once again we conclude that the Monty Hall error is present in this 
block, at least to some degree. 
**Table 5** 
In the next Block, each subject’s valuation was elicited twice per period, both 
before and after one of the remaining cards was revealed to be red. Table 5 shows that the 
averages are almost the same: 39.36 cents before, and 39.57 after.  The averages are very 
close to forty, the true expected payoff value.  The rational L40 null hypothesis is 
rejected for 16 subjects in the before data and for 13 in the after data, fewer than in the R 
periods of Block B but more often than in the U periods.
4  Overall, there is less evidence 
of the Monty Hall error in Block C. Indeed, the irrational G30 null hypothesis that the 
asset value equals 30 is rejected for thirty-eight of forty subjects before, and thirty-nine of 
forty after, the remaining card is revealed to be red.  Virtually all subjects have learned 
that the shares are worth more than thirty.  
**Table 6**   
The experimental design permits another diagnostic test in Block C, comparing 
each subject’s before and after valuations.  Table 6 shows that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis using either the paired-t or the Wilcoxon test.  In conjunction with the result 
that average valuations are near forty, as well as the L40 and G30 results, this result 
confirms that the incidence of the Monty Hall error has declined further by Block C. 
4.3 Solving the Monty Hall problem  
  In Block D, subjects return to the choice task of choosing either the remaining or 
the set-aside card.  Table 7 shows that eight subjects are now choosing the remaining card 
                                                 
4 Perhaps some subjects who make the Monty Hall error in Block B realize in Block C that the U and R 
valuations are inconsistent but make the incorrect adjustment of decreasing the before value towards 30. 
Evidently other subjects resolve the inconsistency correctly, adjusting the after value towards 40. 
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every time (R% = 100%), and only one subject is choosing the set-aside every time (R% 
= 0).  The average R% has increased to 72%, well above the 58% rate in Block A.  The 
binomial null hypothesis, that subjects are randomly choosing set-aside and remaining 
with equal likelihood, is now rejected, even when the R% = 0 and R% = 100% extremists 
are excluded. 
**Table 7**   
**Table 8** 
**Figure 3** 
  Table 8 compares each subject’s R% in Block A with their corresponding R% in 
Block D.  The relation is plotted in Figure 3.  Subjects above the forty-five degree line in 
Figure 3 chose the remaining card more often in Block D than they did in Block A.  
Twenty-five subjects are in this category.  Seven subjects had the same R% in Block D 
and Block A, and only eight subjects had a lower R% in Block D than they did in Block 
A.  Statistical tests confirm the increase in R%.  The null hypothesis that R% is the same 
is rejected with p < .01 using either a paired t-test or a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
Finally, Block E consists of a single period of the choice task, identical to earlier 
choice task periods except that the payoff for correctly choosing the black card is 
multiplied by ten.  Almost 78% of the subjects chose the remaining card in Block E.  The 
incidence of the Monty Hall error is significantly diminished by the end of the session.
5 
   Table 8 also addresses the crucial question of exactly when subjects are learning 
to avoid the Monty Hall error.   It contains the R% by subject for the choice task blocks, 
as well as both the initial and final period valuations by subject for the valuation task 
                                                 
5 In the Friedman (1998) data and some other published data there is an unexplained and puzzling tendency 
for subjects to backslide towards irrationality in the last trial. Thus the 78% rationality rate in Block E is 
especially impressive. 
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blocks.  By the end of Block B, the average valuation is already 39.15, very close to the 
correct expected value of forty.  Statistical tests of the null hypotheses that the valuation 
is increasing during/across blocks are reported in Table 9.   
**Table 9** 
There is a statistically significant increase in valuation from the start of Block B 
to the end of Block B, but no subsequent significant increase. It seems that the majority 
of subjects who learn to solve the Monty Hall problem tend to do so in Block B. 
4.4 Designating the set-aside card 
  The choice of the initial card may represent an important difference between our 
laboratory tasks and those of many other Monty Hall studies.  For example, Friedman 
(1998) has each subject personally choose a card, and then decide later whether or not to 
switch.  In our experiment only one subject (of 4 to 11 subjects in our sessions) picks a 
card each period, and the card is given the rather neutral label “set-aside.”  Subjects are 
not told that the initial card is theirs, nor do they have the opportunity to switch per se.  It 
is possible that these differences in how the Monty Hall problem is presented are 
responsible for our lower initial error rate.  Our procedures may reduce the force of regret 
avoidance, illusion of control and/or status quo bias (Camerer, 1995).
6  
**Table 10**   
**Table 11**   
Our experiment provides some indirect evidence on this issue. Recall that subjects 
took turns designating the set-aside card.  Tables 10 and 11 respectively summarize 
                                                 
6 Illusion of control refers to a subject’s belief that his or her actions somehow influence random events.  
Status quo bias refers to an endowment effect where a subject will prefer (all else the same) his or her 
current choice simply because he or she already has it. See Slembeck (2001) for additional discussion of 
the relevance of these biases to the Monty Hall decision error. 
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subjects’ choices and valuations, according to whether or not they designated the set-
aside card. Table 10 reports a Fisher’s exact test of the null hypothesis that the 
designators’ likelihood of choosing the remaining card is the same as the non-
designators.’ The null hypothesis is never rejected.  We do not detect any difference 
between designators’ and non-designators’ choices in any of the choice blocks. 
Table 11 reports a paired t-test comparing individual subjects’ valuations when 
they designated to their valuations when they did not designate the set-aside card. We 
find a small (less than a penny) but statistically significant difference in the before 
treatment in Block C.  We detect no difference in the other three comparisons. 
 
5. Summary 
Subjects in our experiment learn to overcome the Monty Hall error, and the key 
learning experience appears to be practice in valuing an engineered financial asset. 
Before this learning experience, subjects in the Monty Hall choice task made the 
irrational choice (the “set-aside” card) 42% of the time overall. After the learning 
experience, the irrational choice rate fell to 28% overall and 22% in final choices. Of the 
40 subjects, 13 made the irrational choice more than half of the time before the learning 
experience and only 5 after, while the number making the irrational choice no more than 
a quarter of the time rose from 14 to 26. Many studies have demonstrated the amazing 
strength and persistence of the Monty Hall error, and we are not aware of any individual 
learning treatment that reduced the error rate as much as our valuation task. 
Would subjects have learned to solve the Monty Hall problem without the 
experience of valuing the financial asset?  Our results indicate that the majority of 
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subjects no longer made the Monty Hall error by the end of Block B.  By this point 
subjects had performed a total of 24 repetitions (8 repetitions of the choice task, 8 U-
period valuations, and 8 R-period valuations).  In Friedman (1998), most of the control 
group subjects made the Monty Hall error throughout 25 repetitions of the choice task.  
Further, subjects in one or more of Friedman’s learning treatments frequently made the 
decision error, even though many of the treatments did reduce the error rate.  Even if 
subjects might learn to avoid the Monty Hall error after a sufficient number of repetitions 
of the choice task, our results suggest that experience with the valuation task speeds 
learning considerably. 
Would valuing any financial asset have similar impact? The Kluger and Wyatt 
(2004) study suggests otherwise. Their subjects traded a convertible asset. In terms of our 
parameters, if not converted their asset pays 60 cents when the set-aside card is black 
(and nothing otherwise), while if converted it pays 60 cents when the remaining card is 
black. This more complex asset is equivalent to ours in terms of the uncertainty space 
spanned, and trading it helped to aggregate information. However, it did not noticeably 
reduce individuals’ tendency to commit the Monty Hall error. We conclude that 
appropriate financial engineering can promote learning, above and beyond its ability to 
provide a wider span of securities at lower price.   
  Although our experiment shows that a particular asset design lowers the Monty 
Hall error rate, it does not explain why this design is effective.  We only observe 
subjects’ choices and valuations, not their reasoning.  Nonetheless, the evidence is 
consistent with the following explanation.  While all cards are still face-down, the 
majority of subjects probably believe that there is a one-third chance that the set-aside 
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card is black.  Subjects who are prone to the error likely believe that when the red card is 
revealed, there is an equal chance of either the remaining or set-aside card being black.  
Subjects who make this error therefore mistakenly believe that revealing the red card 
affects the chance that the set-aside card is black. We conjecture that designing the asset 
to pay based on the color of the remaining card makes it easier to see that revealing a red 
card has no effect on the probability.   Once subjects realize this, they can correctly value 
the experimental asset.  The convertible asset does not appear to encourage the same 
learning process. 
Our results illustrate that security design can help subjects learn to avoid the 
Monty Hall error.  Of course, the connection between financial engineering and learning 
may be a two-way street. If breaking down or combining assets to create new ones can 
promote rationality, the reverse must also be true.  Recombining assets can also 
potentially promote irrationality. 
The extent to which cognitive errors affect financial decisions and asset prices is 
an important question.  Even though the Monty Hall anomaly is not a typical financial 
decision-making problem, it is a useful tool for studying cognitive errors, because the 
Monty Hall error is common, and it is very easy to detect. Our results suggest that in at 
least this setting, financial engineering can help foster individual rationality. Whether or 
not financial engineering has a similar effect in other laboratory or field financial markets 
requires further study. But it no longer seems safe to assume that financial engineering 
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A session of the experiment consists of five blocks, with each block consisting of one or more periods.  The 
choice-task periods required subjects to choose between the set-aside card and the remaining card.  The 








A  Choice  8  A red remaining card is always revealed. 
B Valuation  16 
In R (odd-numbered) periods, a red remaining card is always 
revealed.  In U (even-numbered) periods, both remaining cards 
are face-down. 
C Valuation 8  The valuation task is performed both before and after a red 
remaining card is revealed. 
D  Choice  8  A red remaining card is always revealed. 
E  Choice  1  A red remaining card is always revealed.  Payoffs are times ten. 
 
19TABLE 2 
Initial Incidence of the Monty Hall Error 
 
Panel A 
R% is the percentage over eight periods that a subject chooses the remaining card.  Across all subjects, the 
average R% was 58.44%   The row labeled Sample Frequency reports the number of subjects with each 
R%.  The row labeled Expected Frequency contains the expected number of each R% if the subjects’ 
choice was a binomial random variable with probability of one-half. 
        R %       
  0%  12.5% 25% 37.5% 50% 67.5% 75% 87.5%  100% 
Binomial 
Probability  0.00 0.03 0.11 0.22 0.27 0.22 0.11 0.03 0.00 
Expected 
Frequency  0.16 1.25 4.38 8.75  10.94  8.75 4.38 1.25 0.16 
Sample 




Chi-Square goodness-of-fit tests for the sample following a binomial distribution. 









HA   Subjects ARE NOT choosing remaining or set-aside randomly with equal probability. 
 
  
  359.8 <.001 









HA   Subjects ARE NOT choosing remaining or set-aside randomly with equal probability. 
 
  
  8.2 .14 
 
20TABLE 3 
Average Valuations by Subject in Block B 
Valuations are equal to the midpoint of the interval on the valuation forms, except for the endpoints, which 
are 26 (low) and 44 (high).  In R periods, one of the remaining cards was revealed to be red prior to 
valuation. In U periods, both remaining cards were face-down.  The L40 column reports a Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test that the subject’s valuation equals 40, against the alternative that the valuation is less than 
40.  G30 tests the null that the subject’s valuation is 30 against the alternative that the valuation is greater 
than 30.  One asterisk (or two) rejects the null at p = .05 (or p = .01). 
 
    R Periods      U Periods     
  Average Standard      Average Standard   
Subject  Valuation  Deviation  L40 G30    Valuation  Deviation  L40 G30 
1  35.25  1.04  ** **    35.50  0.87  ** ** 
2 39.25  2.60      **    36.75  3.99  *  * 
3  38.25  4.95     **    40.00  0.00     ** 
4  38.75  6.98     *    36.75  4.79     ** 
5  39.50  5.10     **    40.75  4.35     ** 
6  44.00  0.00     **    44.00  0.00     ** 
7  31.50  2.33  **       32.75  7.07  *    
8 36.50  4.50  *  **    39.25  2.63      ** 
9  42.00  1.51     **    44.00  0.00     ** 
10  39.00  4.41     **    42.00  3.87     ** 
11 34.75  2.12  **  **    40.50  2.18      ** 
12 36.00  3.55  *  **    44.00  0.00      ** 
13 34.50  4.24  *  **    31.50  1.32  **  * 
14  40.00  0.00     **    40.00  0.00     ** 
15 35.00  4.94  *  *    35.50  0.87  **  ** 
16 37.50  2.78  *  **    44.00  0.00      ** 
17 39.50  0.93      **    40.50  0.87   ** 
18  41.75  6.36     **    44.00  0.00     ** 
19  42.75  3.54     **    41.50  4.33     ** 
20  39.25  6.58     **    40.50  5.17     ** 
21 37.75  6.45      *    37.50  5.36  **  * 
22 37.00  3.70  *  **    33.25  3.60  **  * 
23 42.75  1.04      **    41.75  1.20   ** 
24  39.75  3.77     **    40.00  3.46     ** 
25 37.75  0.71  **  **    38.25  0.66      ** 
26 35.75  2.49  **  **    39.00  3.32      ** 
27  41.25  4.13     **    39.50  4.77     ** 
28  30.75  2.38  **       38.50  4.77     ** 
29  39.25  3.54     **    38.25  3.38     ** 
30 32.25  2.92  **      39.25  1.98      ** 
31  31.00  6.41  **       44.00  0.00     ** 
32 38.50  0.93  *  **    38.50  0.87  *  ** 
33 36.00  3.55  *  **    38.75  2.99      ** 
34 34.13  2.03  **  **    35.50  5.55  *  * 
35  39.75  3.77     **    39.25  1.39     ** 
36  43.50  1.41     **    44.00  0.00     ** 
37  42.25  4.95     **    44.00  0.00     ** 
38 35.50  6.02  *  *    41.50  2.18      ** 
39 35.25  4.89  *  *    41.50  6.61      ** 
40 32.00  3.70  **        34.00  4.00  **  ** 
ALL  37.68  5.05   20  35     39.50  4.65  10  39 
 
21TABLE 4 
Comparing R and U Period Valuations in Block B 
Paired t-test and Wilcoxon Signed rank test comparing a subject’s average valuation in R periods to his or 
her average valuation in U periods.  In R periods, one of the remaining cards was revealed to be red prior to 
valuation. In U periods, both remaining cards were face-down. 
 
 
N  =  40 t Prob  Signed 
rank  Prob 
 
HO   Subject average valuations in the R period EQUAL their 
average valuations in the U periods. 
 
    
 
HA   Subject average valuations in the R period are LESS THAN 
their average valuations in the U periods. 
 
    
 3.35  <.01  198  <.01 
22TABLE 5 
Average Valuations by Subject in Block C 
Valuations are equal to the midpoint of the interval on the valuation forms, except for the endpoints, which 
are 26 (low) and 44 (high).   Valuations were elicited first before, and then after, one of the remaining cards 
was revealed.  The L40 column reports a Wilcoxon signed-rank test that the subject’s valuation equals 40, 
against the alternative that the valuation is less than 40.  G30 tests the null that the subject’s valuation is 30 
against the alternative that the valuation is greater than 30.  One asterisk (or two) rejects the null at p = .05 
(or p = .01). 
 
    After     Before    
  Average Standard      Average Standard   
Subject  Valuation  Deviation  L40 G30    Valuation  Deviation  L40 G30 
1 39.75  0.71    **    39.50 1.41   ** 
2 39.75  0.71    **    39.25 1.49   * 
3 40.00  0.00    **    40.00 0.00   ** 
4 41.50  3.51    **    38.25 1.28  * ** 
5 44.00  0.00    **    44.00 0.00   ** 
6 44.00  0.00    **    44.00 0.00   ** 
7 39.25  5.44    **    35.75 7.13  * *   
8 39.25  5.55    **    39.50 3.34   ** 
9 43.75  0.71    **    44.00 0.00   ** 
10 44.00  0.00   **    44.00 0.00   ** 
11 43.50  1.41   **    43.50 1.41   ** 
12 37.50  0.93  **  **    44.00 0.00   ** 
13 31.25  1.49  **  **    30.75 1.49  **  
14 40.00  0.00   **    40.00 0.00   ** 
15 36.00  0.00  **  **    35.75 0.71  ** ** 
16 36.00  0.00  **  **    44.00 0.00   ** 
17 40.00  0.00   **    40.00 0.00   ** 
18 41.75  6.36   **    44.00 0.00   ** 
19 42.50  4.24   **    44.00 0.00   ** 
20 38.25  6.36   **    44.00 0.00   ** 
21 41.75  0.71   **    41.75 0.71   ** 
22 36.50  2.56  *  **    34.50 2.33  ** ** 
23 42.00  0.00   **    42.00 0.00   ** 
24 35.00  5.01  **  *    38.00 0.00  ** ** 
25 38.25  0.71  **  **    37.75 0.71  ** ** 
26 36.25  1.98  **  **    37.00 1.51  ** ** 
27 44.00  0.00   **    42.50 4.24   ** 
28 33.25  5.12  *      34.50 5.42  * * 
29 38.25  3.92   **    35.75 1.98  ** ** 
30 38.50  6.30   **    31.75 0.71  ** ** 
31 36.00  8.94       44.00 0.00   ** 
32 38.00  0.00  **  **    38.00 0.00  ** ** 
33 37.75  3.45   **    37.00 3.70  * ** 
34 36.25  0.71  **  **    34.00 0.00  ** ** 
35 38.25  0.71  **  **    37.38 3.50  * ** 
36 44.00  0.00   **    44.00 0.00   ** 
37 44.00  0.00   **    44.00 0.00   ** 
38 40.75  3.20   **    38.75 2.60   ** 
39 34.50  5.43  **  *    37.00 4.66   ** 
40 39.00  6.41   **    34.75 1.83  ** ** 
ALL  39.36  4.57  13 38    39.57  4.37  16 39 
23TABLE 6 
Comparing Before and After Valuations in Block C 
Values are elicited both before and after one of the remaining cards is revealed to be red.  Paired t-test and 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test compare averages across subjects. 
 
 
N  =  40 t Prob  Signed 
rank  Prob 
 
HO   Subject average valuations after the red card is revealed 
EQUAL average valuations before the card is revealed. 
 
    
 
HA   Subject average valuations after the red card is revealed are 
LESS THAN average valuations before the card is revealed. 
 
    
 .45  .33  -7.0  .56 
 
24TABLE 7 
Incidence of the Monty Hall Error in Block D 
 
Panel A 
R% is the percentage over eight periods that a subject chooses the remaining card.  Across all subjects, the 
average R% was 72.19%.  The row labeled Sample Frequency reports the number of subjects with each 
R%.  The row labeled Expected Frequency contains the expected number for each R% if the subjects’ 
choice was a binomial random variable with probability of one-half. 
 
        R %       
  0%  12.5% 25% 37.5% 50% 67.5% 75% 87.5%  100% 
Binomial 
Probability  0.00 0.03 0.11 0.22 0.27 0.22 0.11 0.03 0.00 
Expected 
Frequency  0.16 1.25 4.38 8.75  10.94  8.75 4.38 1.25 0.16 
Sample 




Chi-Square goodness-of-fit tests for the sample following a binomial distribution. 
 









HA   Subjects ARE NOT choosing remaining or set-aside randomly with equal probability. 
 
  
  476.2 <.001 









HA   Subjects ARE NOT choosing remaining or set-aside randomly with equal probability. 
 
  
  77.9 <.001 
 
25TABLE 8 
Responses by Block 
R% is the average rate (out of eight periods) of a subject choosing the remaining card. Block B valuations 
are for the R periods only (when one of the remaining cards is revealed to be red).  Block C valuations are 
the after (the red remaining card is revealed) valuations.  Block E is a single period of the choice task.  
“Yes” signifies that the subject chose the remaining card.  “No” signifies he or she chose the set-aside card. 
 
  Block A  Block B  Block B  Block C  Block C  Block D  Block E 
    Initial Final Initial Final     
Subject  R%  Valuation Valuation Valuation Valuation  R%  R 
1  62.5%  34 36 38 40  75.0%  YES 
2  75.0%  40 40 38 40  87.5%  YES 
3  37.5%  26 40 40 40  75.0%  YES 
4  50.0%  32 44 44 36  75.0%  YES 
5  25.0%  34 44 44 44  87.5%  YES 
6  50.0%  44 44 44 44  87.5%  YES 
7  37.5%  32 32 36 30  62.5%  NO 
8  75.0%  30 40 40 42  87.5%  NO 
9  62.5%  40 44 44 44  50.0%  YES 
10  25.0%  38 44 44 44  75.0%  YES 
11  87.5%  34 40 44 44  100.0%  YES 
12  0.0%  44 36 36 38  100.0%  YES 
13  12.5%  34 34 32 30  25.0%  YES 
14  100.0%  40 40 40 40  100.0%  YES 
15  87.5%  34 36 36 36  87.5%  YES 
16  75.0%  38 36 36 36  87.5%  YES 
17  100.0%  38 40 40 40  100.0%  YES 
18  62.5%  44 44 44 26  87.5%  YES 
19  37.5%  34 44 44 44  75.0%  YES 
20  50.0%  44 32 32 44  75.0%  YES 
21  37.5%  30 42 42 42  50.0%  YES 
22  75.0%  40 36 38 42  87.5%  YES 
23  100.0%  44 42 42 42  100.0%  YES 
24  25.0%  44 40 36 38  12.5%  NO 
25  0.0%  36 38 38 40  0.0%  YES 
26  62.5%  32 36 36 36  50.0%  NO 
27  37.5%  34 36 44 44  50.0%  NO 
28  62.5%  32 34 28 26  75.0%  YES 
29  87.5%  36 44 40 38  62.5%  NO 
30  100.0%  30 38 44 38  62.5%  NO 
31  62.5%  26 44 26 44  75.0%  NO 
32  50.0%  40 38 38 38  100.0%  YES 
33  100.0%  34 34 36 36  37.5%  NO 
34  62.5%  30 34 36 38  87.5%  YES 
35  0.0%  40 40 40 38  100.0%  YES 
36  100.0%  44 44 44 44  100.0%  YES 
37  100.0%  44 44 44 44  87.5%  YES 
38  37.5%  38 40 40 44  50.0%  YES 
39  62.5%  36 34 36 40  37.5%  YES 
40  62.5%  30 38 36 44  62.5%  YES 
AVERAGE  58.4% 36.35 39.15 39.00 39.45 72.2%  77.5% 
26TABLE 9 
Hypothesis Tests for the Monty Hall Error by Block 
 
Panel A 
Paired t-test and Wilcoxon signed rank test compare a subject’s R% in Block A (at the start of the session) 
to his or her R% in Block D (at the end of the session). R% is the average rate (out of eight periods) of a 
subject choosing the remaining card.  
N  =  40 t Prob  Signed 
rank  Prob 
HO   A subject’s R% in Block D EQUALS his or her R% in  
Block A      
HA  A subject’s R% in Block D is GREATER THAN  his or her 
R% in Block A      
  2.80 <.01 150.5 <.01 
 
Panel B 
Paired t-test and Wilcoxon signed rank test compare a subjects’ initial R-period valuation (period 1) in 
Block B to his or her final R-period valuation (period 15) in Block B. 
N  =  40 t Prob  Signed 
rank  Prob 
HO   A Subject’s last valuation in Block B EQUALS his or her first 
valuation in Block B. 
 
    
HA   A Subject’s last valuation in Block B is GREATER THAN his 
or her first valuation in Block B.      
R periods  2.97  <.01  133.0  <.01 
 
Panel C 
Paired t-test and Wilcoxon Signed rank test compare a subjects’ final R-period valuation (period 15) in 
Block B to his or her initial valuation (period 1, after the red card is revealed) in Block C.  
N  =  40 t Prob  Signed 
rank  Prob 
HO   A Subject’s first valuation in Block C EQUALS his or her last 
valuation in Block B. 
 
    
HA   A Subject’s first valuation in Block C is GREATER THAN 
his or her last valuation in Block B.      
R periods in Block B and After Valuations in Block C  -.25  .60  4.0  .57 
 
Panel D 
Paired t-test and Wilcoxon Signed rank test compare a subjects’ final valuation (period 8, after the red card 
is revealed) in Block C to his or her initial valuation (period 1, after the red card is revealed) in Block C. 
N  =  40 t Prob  Signed 
rank  Prob 
HO   A Subject’s last valuation in Block C EQUALS his or her first 
valuation in Block C. 
 
    
HA   A Subject’s last valuation in Block C is GREATER THAN his 
or her first valuation in Block C.      
R periods in Block B and After Valuations in Block C  .54  .30  22.5  .22 
27TABLE 10 
Choice Task and Designating the Set-Aside Card 
Each period, one of the subjects had his or her turn to designate which card is the set-aside card.  Fisher’s 
exact test is used to test the hypothesis: 
 
HO   Subjects who designated have an EQUAL probability of choosing the remaining card as 
subjects who did not designate. 
 
HA   Subjects who designated have an UNEQUAL probability of choosing the remaining card as 
subjects who did not designate. 
 
BLOCK A       








Set -Aside  22 18   
Did Not 
Designate  165 115   
    0.73 
BLOCK D       








Set -Aside  25 15   
Did Not 
Designate  206 74   
    0.19 
BLOCK E       








Set -Aside  4 1   
Did Not 
Designate  27 8   
    0.99 
 
28TABLE 11 
Valuation Task and Designating the Set-Aside Card 
Each period, one of the subjects had his or her turn to designate which card is the set-aside card.  Block C 
valuations are the after (the red remaining card is revealed) valuations.  Paired t-tests are used to test the 
hypothesis: 
 
HO   Subject’s average valuation when designating EQUALS his or her average valuation when not 
designating. 
 
HA   Subject’s average valuation when designating is NOT EQUAL to his or her average valuation 
when not designating 
 
 








t-statistic Prob  Signed 
Rank  Prob N 
R  Periods  36.33  36.98  0.92  0.37 -14 0.71  26 
U  Periods  39.96  40.07  0.28  0.78 2.5 0.91  26 
             
BLOCK  C            
Before 40.14  39.25  2.13 0.04 53.5 0.03  35 
After 39.77  39.35  0.84  0.41 24 0.48  35 
             
*These averages are calculated as follows.  First the average valuations (for designating and not-designating periods) for each subject 
are calculated.  These numbers are then averaged across subjects.  For each block, only subjects who designated in some periods and 
did not designate in others are included. 
 
29FIGURE 1 
The Sequence of Events for a Period of the Choice Task 
 
 
Three ordinary playing cards are placed face-down on a mat with positions labeled 
1, 2, and 3.  Two of the cards are red (diamonds or hearts), and one is black (club or 
spade).  One subject (a volunteer) chooses one of the cards, which is then designated 
as the set-aside card.  The other two cards are designated as the remaining cards. 
The conductor looks at the two remaining cards and reveals one of them.  The 
revealed card is always a red card. 
Each subject privately chooses either the set-aside card, or the remaining card.  If 
the subject correctly chooses the black card, he or she wins sixty cents.  If incorrect, 
the subject does not earn anything this period. 
Both the set-aside card and the remaining card are revealed. 
30FIGURE 2 




Three ordinary playing cards are placed face-down on a mat with positions labeled 
1, 2, and 3.  Two of the cards are red (diamonds or hearts), and one is black (club or 
spade).  One subject (a volunteer) chooses one of the cards, which is then designated 
as the set-aside card.  The other two cards are designated as the remaining cards. 
The conductor looks at the two 
remaining cards and reveals one 
of them.  The revealed card is 
always a red card. 
U Period  U+R Period 
Subjects can privately select prices at which they would be willing to sell their share 
(Simplified Becker-DeGroot-Marchak method). 
Each subject receives a share of an experimental asset which pays sixty cents if 
either of the remaining cards is black, and zero otherwise. 
The price is chosen, based on a drawing of possible prices from a bingo cage.  If a 
subject was willing to sell at the selected price, then their sell order is executed. 
Subjects again can privately 
select prices at which they 
would be willing to sell their 
share.   A volunteer then rolls a 
six-sided die.  If the result is 4 or 
more, then these valuations 
replace the earlier valuations. 
The conductor looks at the two 
remaining cards and reveals one 
of them.  The revealed card is 
always a red card. 

























The Monty Hall Error in Block A and Block D 
  R% is the average rate (out of eight periods) of a subject choosing the remaining card.  The number to the right of the diamond 
represents the number of subjects with the corresponding values for R% in Blocks A and D.  A diamond without a number 
denotes one subject.  
 
3 2 
2 2 3 
2 4 
4  2 
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You are about to participate in an experiment in financial decision-making.  If you follow 
these instructions carefully, and make good decisions, you may earn a considerable amount 
of money.  Today’s session will consist of three parts.  Your overall earnings will be the total 
of your earnings in each part.  At the end of the experiment, you will receive your overall 
earnings in cash. 
 
This part of the experiment will consist of several separate periods.  At the start of each 
period, three playing cards will be placed face down in random order in the 1, 2, and 3 spot 
on a mat.  The face-down cards are ordinary playing cards.  Two of the cards will be red 





A volunteer will then choose a number: “1”, “2”, or “3”.  The number chosen will be used to 
designate a card as the “set-aside” card.  For example, if the volunteer chooses “3”, the mat 





The next step will be to reveal one of the two remaining cards.  We will not reveal the set-
aside card. The conductor will look at the other two remaining cards and always reveal a red 
card.  Continuing the example in Figure 2, the conductor will look at cards 1 and 2, and 
reveal one of them.  The revealed card will always be a red card. Suppose the conductor turns 

















At this point, you will be asked to choose a card.  Your goal will be to choose the black card.  
If you choose the black card, you will win 60 cents, but if you choose the red card, you will not 
win any money this period.   
 
           
Subject 
ID       
         Period       
                
      
Your Guess for the Black 
Card:        
      
      Set Aside Card    
               
      Remaining Card    
                    
Figure 4 
 
Fill in the form by checking the appropriate box.  If you check “set aside”, then you will win 
60 cents if the “set-aside” card is black, and nothing otherwise.  If you check “remaining”, 
then you will win 60 cents if the “set aside” card is red, and nothing otherwise. Continuing 
the example from Figure 3, if you choose “set aside”, you will win if card 3 is black.  If you 
choose “remaining” you will win if card 1 is black. 
 
The conductor will then collect the forms and reveal both of the cards.  If you correctly chose 
the black card, your winnings will be added to your earnings for this part of the experiment. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Frequently Asked Questions: 
 
Q:  Is this some kind of psychology experiment with an agenda you 
haven't told us? 
A:  No.  It is an economics experiment.  If we do anything deceptive, 
or don't pay you cash as described, then you can complain to the campus 
Human Subjects Committee and we will be in serious trouble.  These 
instructions are on the level and our interest is in seeing how people 
make decisions in certain situations. 
 
Q:  Is my performance in any way linked to that of other people in the 
room? 
A:  No, this is an experiment in individual decision making.  Your 
actions do not in any way affect the payoffs of other subjects, nor do 
their actions affect yours. 
 
Q:  Is it possible to lose money in this experiment?  Will I have to 
pay you? 
A:  No, you cannot lose money. Each time you can correctly choose the 
black card, you will earn money.  Conversely, each time you guess 




This part of the experiment will consist of several periods, and each period will have several 
steps.  The sequence of events for a period is listed and explained below. 
  1  Receive  new  share 
  2  Card  placement 
  3  Selection  of  the  set-aside  card 
  4  Sometimes  a  red  card is revealed 
    5  Chance to sell your share 
    6  All cards are revealed and earnings are calculated 
 
1. Receive new share. 
You will receive one new share of an experimental asset.  The share will be redeemed at the 
end of each period.  The value of the shares will depend on whether or not the remaining 
card is a black card (this will be explained further below).  The share will pay 60 cents if the 
remaining card is black, and will pay zero otherwise.  
 
2. Card placement. 
As, in Part 1, three playing cards will be placed face down in random order in their position 
on a mat.  The face-down cards are ordinary playing cards.  Two of the cards will be red 
(diamonds or hearts) and one of the cards will be black (clubs or spades).  There are three 
positions on the mat, labeled “1”, “2”, and “3”. 
 
3. Selection of the set-aside card. 
Just as in Part 1, a volunteer will pick a number in order to designate a card as the “set-
aside” card.  The other two cards are the designated as the remaining cards.   
 
4. Sometimes a red card is revealed. 
In some of the periods, the conductor will look at the two remaining cards, and reveal one of 
them.  The conductor will not reveal the set-aside card and will always reveal a red card.  In 
some of the periods, this step will be skipped; the conductor will not look at or reveal any of 
the remaining cards. 
 
5. Chance to sell your share. 
In this step, you may make an offer to sell your share.  The offer may or may not be accepted.  




Circle the choices you prefer:
Sell your share for:
Keep your share 27 cents
Keep your share 29 cents
Keep your share 31 cents
Keep your share 33 cents
Keep your share 35 cents
Keep your share 37 cents
Keep your share 39 cents
Keep your share 41 cents
Keep your share 43 cents  
Figure 1 
35Fill out the form by circling your preferred choices.  If you are willing to sell your share for 27 
cents, then circle the 27 cents in the first row.  If not, circle “Keep your share.”  Similarly, if 
you are willing to sell for 29 cents, then circle 29.  If not, circle “Keep your share,” and so on 
for each row of the form. 
 
For example, if you are willing to sell your share for a price of 33 cents or higher, fill in your 
form as in Figure 2. 
id
period
Circle the choices you prefer:
Sell your share for:
Keep your share 27 cents
Keep your share 29 cents
Keep your share 31 cents
Keep your share 33 cents
Keep your share 35 cents
Keep your share 37 cents
Keep your share 39 cents
Keep your share 41 cents
Keep your share 43 cents  
Figure 2 
 
The actual price is decided by a drawing from a bingo cage containing a distribution of balls, 
labeled 27, 29, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39, 41 and 43.  A volunteer will spin a bingo cage and randomly 
choose a ball.  The number on the ball chosen will represent the price for this period.   
 
Continuing the example, suppose the volunteer randomly selects a “41.”  Since you circled 41, 
you will sell your share for 41 cents.  If instead a “27” was selected, you do not sell because 
you circled “Keep you share” if the price is 27 cents. 
 
6.  All cards are revealed and earnings are calculated. 
The face-down cards are turned over. Each share of the asset will pay the bearer 60 cents if 
one of the remaining cards was black, and pays nothing if both were red. 
 
If you sold your share, then your earnings for the period will simply be the sale price.  For 
example, if you sold your share in step 5 for 41 cents, then your earnings for the period will 
be 41 cents, regardless of whether or not the remaining card(s) is black. 
 
If you did not sell your share, then you will earn 60 cents for the period if the remaining 
card(s) is black and nothing if the set-aside card is black.  If step 4 was not skipped, then 
there will only be one “remaining” card still face-down.  If step 4 was skipped, there will be 
two remaining face-down cards.  In this case, you will earn 60 cents if either of the two 
remaining cards is the black card. 
 
After the cards are revealed, your share is liquidated, so it doesn’t carry over to the next 
period.  You will receive a new share at the start of the next period.  Your earnings for the 
period will be added to your overall earnings, and the next period will start. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Frequently Asked Questions: 
 
Q:  Can I affect the share price? 
A:  No.  Remember that the share price is determined by a drawing from 
a bingo cage.  The price you circle will not affect which ball is drawn 
36from the cage.  The prices you circle will only affect whether or not 
you will sell if one of those prices are chosen. 
 
Q:  Is it ever profitable to circle “sell” at a price that is lower 
than the amount I think the share is worth? 
A:  No.  Suppose your value for a share is 36 cents.  If so, you should 
circle “keep your share” at 27, 29, 31, 33, or 35, and you should 
circle “sell your share” at 37, 39, 41 and 43 cents.  Let’s call this 
the original strategy.  To see why this is best, consider an alternate 
strategy, where you make a single change. Now you select “sell your 
share” at 35 cents.  If the price (determined by the bingo drawing is 
27, 29, 31, or 33, you will keep your share regardless of whether you 
choose the original or the alternate strategy.  Similarly, if the price 
is 37, 39, 41, or 43, you will sell you share regardless which strategy 
you choose.  The only time there will be a difference is when the price 
is 35 cents.  With the original strategy, you keep the share, but with 
the alternate strategy, you will sell.  Keeping the share is better 
because if it is worth 36 to you, you would rather keep the share than 
sell it for 35 cents. 
 
Q:  Is it ever profitable to circle “sell” at a price that is higher 
than the amount I think the share is worth? 
A:  No.  A similar example will show you why.  Suppose your value for a 
share is 36 cents.  If so, you should circle “keep your share” at 27, 
29, 31, 33, or 35, and you should circle “sell your share” at 37, 39, 
41 and 43 cents.  Let’s call this the original strategy.  Now, consider 
an alternate strategy where you now change your response to “keep your 
share” at 37 cents. The only time there will be a difference is when 
the price is 37 cents.  With the original strategy, you sell the share, 
but with the alternate strategy, you will keep.  Keeping the share is 
worse because if it is worth 36 to you, you would rather sell the share 
for 37 cents than keep it. 
37Part 3 
 
Just as in the previous part, the experiment will consist of several periods, and each period 
will have several steps.  The sequence of events for a period is modified from the sequence 
that you have just completed as shown below. 
 
  1  Receive  new  share 
  2  Card  placement 
  3  Selection  of  the  set-aside  card 
    4a  Chance to sell your share 
    5  A red card is revealed 
    4b  Chance to sell your share 
    6  All cards are revealed and earnings are calculated 
 
1. Receive new share. 
You will receive one new share of an experimental asset.  The shares will be redeemed at the 
end of each period.  The value of the shares will depend on whether or not the remaining 
card is a black card.  As in part 1, each share you own will pay 60 cents if the remaining card 
is black, and will pay zero otherwise.  
 
2. Card placement. 
Three playing cards will be placed face down in random order in their position on a mat.  The 
face-down cards are ordinary playing cards.  Two of the cards will be red (diamonds or 
hearts) and one of the cards will be black (clubs or spades).  There are three positions on the 
mat, labeled “1”, “2”, and “3”.   
 
3. Selection of the set-aside card. 
A volunteer will choose a number to designate a card as the “set-aside” card.  The other two 
cards are the designated as the remaining cards.   
 
4a. Chance to sell your share. 
Just as in part 1, you may now make an offer to sell your share.  However, in this part of the 
experiment, you will make two offers to sell.  The first offer is made in this step, and the 
second offer will be in step 4b (see below).  Only one of these offers will be used to determine 
whether or not you sell your share.  Exactly as before, the first offer is made by circling your 
preferred choices.  The actual price will be determined in step 4b. 
 
5. A red card is revealed. 
The conductor will look at the two remaining cards, and reveal one of them.  The conductor 
will not reveal the set-aside card and will always reveal a red card. 
 
4b. Chance to sell your share. 
In this step, you may make another offer to sell your share.  Fill out a second form by circling 
your preferred choices.   
 
Before the price is determined, a volunteer will roll an ordinary six-sided die. If a “1”, “2” or 
“3” is rolled, then the first form (from step 4a) will be used, and the second form (from step 
4b) will be discarded.  If a “4”, “5” or “6” is rolled, then the second form will be used and the 
first form will be discarded. 
 
The actual price is now decided by a drawing from a bingo cage containing a distribution of 
balls, labeled 27, 29, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39, 41 and 43.  A volunteer will spin a bingo cage and 
38randomly choose a ball.  The number on the ball chosen will represent the price for this 
period.  
 
6.  All cards are revealed and earnings are calculated. 
The face-down card is now turned over. Each share of the asset will pay the bearer 60 cents if 
one of the remaining cards was black, and pays nothing if both were red. 
 
After the cards are revealed, your share is liquidated, so it doesn’t carry over to the next 
period.  You will receive a new share at the start of the next period.  Your earnings for the 
period will be added to your overall earnings, and the next period will start. 
39